June 10, 2008

Burn ‘em at the stake!: Refuting Cowen’s Libertarian Heresies

Tylor Cowen goes to bat against paleolibertarianism

Tylor Cowen, who has artfully managed to turn economic analysis into a running commentary on life style enhancement, has recently given a succinct summary of his objections to what he no doubt considers the “fundamentalist” version of libertarianism.  Many people would like to replace this older ideology of the right, which might be called paleolibertarianism, popularized from the time of Albert J. Nock to that of Murray Rothbard under the slogan “our enemy is the state” with somthing like “look at the state we’ve  gotten ourselves into…can’t something be done to improve it?”  Tyler Cowen is by no means the only person who shares this point of view, he is simply its most articulate advocate.  The idea is that the monker “libertarian” is just too good to be wasted on anarchists and other of their ilk who really want to radically curb the principle of coercion in public life.  Rather it should be awarded to the respectable oppenents of leftism: the social democrats, neoconservatives, and life style liberals who otherwise would have nothing better to call themselves than “cosmopolitans.”

It is to Cowen’s credit that he has come up with a list of priciples which distinguish these pro-capitalist cosmopolitains from libertarians, and that he has admitted that in the eyes of the latter the former are heretics.  In an address to the Institute of Humane Studies he formulated a series of principles which, in his mind at least, distinguished pro-freedom cosmopolitans from libertarians.  This is, of course, a “galaxy far far away” from yours truely, and moreover I am relying on second hand information, the blog of skepticlawyer who seems to live in Australia (at least my own hemisphere).  None the less to the extent that I can reconstruct Cowen’s address, the principles seem to be five in number:

1.  People are freer now that they were in the past

2. The proportional size of the state has diminished in relation to the growth of civil society.

3. It is meaningful to speak of postive as well as negative rights.

4. The establishment of the rule of law is anterior to any possible calculus of freedom vs. unfreedom among a population, and a prerequisite for any advance in freedom.

5. The cultural values of a population must be considered anterior to any abstract notion of the advance in freedom.  Less freedom may be preferable, in the eyes of the population, to the sacrifice of other values to the end of greater freedom.

These are weighty statements which almost guarantee the consent of our prudence and common sense.  Whether they are true is yet another question.  I hope some mind equal to the task will refute them in their totality and preserve the radical integrity of the libertarian movement.  After all a slogan like “look at the state we’ve gotten ourselves into…can’t something be done to improve it” is less likely to send people to the barracades than “hate the state.”  But then of course, that may be the real motive for the cosmopolitans’ defection from old-style radical libertarianism.  It may be  an attempt to put prudence and self-preservation ahead of principle, certainly an understandable motive…but one which opens up the possibility of refutation.

I for one find it difficult to resist the temptation of chiping away piecemeal at these “heresies”…if only to see if some deeper foundation can be discovered for the paleoconservative position.  Tylor has thrown down the gauntlet…now let’s see how many will take up the challenge!

June 6, 2008

Sudha Shenoy: In Memoriam

A Woman in the True Tradition of Political Economy

Sudha Shenoy 1947-2008, was more than an economist, she was a keeper of academic traditions, a living lore-mistress, a transition belt between cultures and generations of scholars. She was one who both introduced me, and then reintroduced me, to the world of Austrian economics, which was quite a feat in itself, since in those days I was a kind of refugee from a different cognitive world. Sudha was the kind of economist who could speak to a disaffected social scientist or even literary critic in such terms as to make the “dismal science” of economics come alive as a branch of the humanities.

I really only knew her briefly, but now that she is gone a host of memories crowd in on me…things that she said in an off handed way which struck everyone present as profound, yet largely went unrecorded for posterity. For example, she once conjectured the “throw away hypothesis” that most Austrian economists came from marginalized religious backgrounds, that is to say, they were more likely to be the children of atheists, Quakers, or Jews than, for example, Methodists. Her implication was that the principles espoused by Mises and others could be seen as an amplification of the rhetoric of dissent (which in the Anglo-Saxon world included Catholics like Neuman). She herself was a dissenter from her own tradition, for she had become a Buddhist by choice. Most Westerners would be hard pressed to distinguish a Hindu from a Buddhist, and I imply no invidious comparison, but for Sudha it was a characteristically intellectual choice…a rejection of cast and mythogogy for reason or “dharma” a Sanskrit term which approximates the Greco-Christian term “logos.”

Another shocking manifestation of Suda’s dissenting mentality was her rejection of the cult of Mohandas Ghandi. At the time I met her there was a vigorous trend among libertarians to incorporate Ghandi among the icons of the movement on the pretext that there was an unbreached continuity between the nonaggression principle and a strategy of nonviolence. Although there was never a gentler person than Sudha Shenoy, she was quick at spotting and denouncing cant in whatever cultural guise it appeared. Once she explained to me that even the wife of the Great Souled One considered him a madman. Well, considering that her husband adopted celibacy without calling a family conference to discuss the matter in advance…Mrs. Ghandi may have had some insight that the rest of us lack.

Yet for all of her critical acumen, Sudha was a conservative thinker in the very best sense. She was impatient of those neologizing disciplinary distinctions which seem based more on the unionization of intellectual nitch-holders than on real differences in subject matter. I remember a debate at George Mason over who had been the first to recognize the division of labor. Cantillon was said to have gotten it earlier than Smith, while others claimed that it was all to be found in the writings of the Spanish Scholastics. Sudha settled it with one word: “Plato” which compelled our assent, for everyone (well almost) remembered the passage of the Republic where Socrates had described specialized exchange within his soon-to-be-reformed “city of pigs.” Although Plato seldom appears on reading lists compiled for the inspiration of libertarians, the passage is there and its priority is unquestioned.

That was Sudha. She was never one to reject a valid insight, no matter of what obscure and dubious provenance. This made her a balancing influence within the world of Austrian scholarship. Among the Misesians she was a Hayekian, and among the Hayekians she was always trying to push towards a more fundamental and radical reinstatement of liberty. In a wider sense, her mind encompassed strands which had been sundered since the time of what Karl Jasper called the “Axial Age” i.e. of c. 600B.C, up to the present: Greek philosophy, Indian metaphysics, British political economy, the Mengerian revolution, contemporary social science, and American libertarianism. Yet the result of these influences was not a miasma of eclecticism, but a mind all the more focused on a single goal…a world governed not by coercion but by spontaneous and tacit agreements. No doubt Suda would wish, in lieu of mourning the loss of that mind, that we should redouble our efforts in pursuit of its goal.

April 25, 2008

Tom Paine and our pain: A critique of Rothbard’s reasoning on republics

“The Sudden Emergence of Tom Pain” and the evolution of libertarian theory

It is a maxim of conservative thought, which should be fully shared by paleolibertarians, that good things evolve, while evil things burst suddenly into the world with revolutionary force.  In the short time since the death of Murray Rothbard (1995), paleolibertarian theory has continued to clarify itself through small increments of incisive reasoning.  This is, of course, as Murray would have wanted it, for if there was anything that he was more skeptical of than the idea of a “new libertarian man” it would have to be the notion  that he himself provided an infallible model of such a person.

One of the most surprising turns in the late and post-Rothbardian period of libertarian theorizing has been the rehabilitation of monarchism stimulated by Hans Hermann Hoppe in his Democracy: The God That Failed.  This paleoconservative/paleolibertarian synthesis is indeed a promised land which Rothbard, even looking out from the highest Pisgah peak of his theory could but vaguely dicern.  Thus the excerpting of a portion of Rothbard’s history of the independence movement Concieved in Liberty by the Ludwig von Mises Institute provides a valuable opportunity to assess the limits of Rothbardian thinking, as well as to explore a new trajectory of thought which was mostly unguessed at during his lifetime.  I can add nothing to the brilliant analysis of “private government” (aka monarchy) as a stable and equitable economic system contained in Hoppe.  However there is another dimension to the critique of republicanism which was overlooked by Rothbard, a dimension which, for want of a better term, might be called “social psychology.”  Hoppe is no doubt aware of this dimension, but in his works he makes the case for “private government” according to the strict methodological rationalism of the Austrian school.  Although I am every bit of a rationalist as Hoppe, here my approach will be more phenomenological, which might be termed rational inquiry into the irrational.

No Country for Old Kings

Anyone familiar with Rothbard will, upon encountering “The Sudden Emergence of Tom Pain” get the sudden shock of arriving at a critical juncture in Rothbardian historiography.  For those unfamiliar with him, it is sufficient to point out that Rothbard always approaches American history from an antipoidal perspective, and the expression “everything you were taught in the standard textbooks is the precise opposite of the truth” will serve as a handy outline of his thinking on practically any issue.  Thus World War II should not have been fought, not to mention World War I, the North was the agressor in the Civil War, civil service “reforms” were less just than the spoils system…the list could be extended indefinitely.

However with “The Sudden Emergence of Tom Paine” Rothbard suddenly rejoins the mainstream narrative of American history.  Why, apart from the fact that Rothbard was Rothbard and not Hoppe, should this have been so?  As “The Sudden Emergence” explains…

One of the main stumbling blocks to a commitment to independence was personal loyalty to the British crown.  There has always been a political taboo of almost mystical force against attacking the head of state, and always the convenient though emasculating custom of attributing his sins to his evil or incompetent advisors.  Such long-standing habits impeded a rational analysis of the deeds of King George III.  Furthermore, the old and obsolete Whig ideal of virtual independence under a figurehead king of both Britain and America could only be shattered if the king were to be attacked personally.

The key political concept here is “the old and obsolete Whig ideal of virtual independence under a figurehead king.”  Uncharacteristically, Rothbard is taking a narrative rather than a synoptic viewpoint here, that is to say, he is robbing himself of historical hindsight to take up the perspective of an British American living at the eve of the revolution.  Yes, from the vantage point of such a person the “Whig ideal of virtual independence under a king” might have appeared “old and obsolete.”  Since the end of the French and Indian War the British parliament had been trying to stage a coup d’etat against the institutions and liberties of the American colonies.  On top of that the Hannoverian dynasty was begining to show signs of discontent with its “figurehead” status.  The thrid George was now a fully assimilated Britisher, and just mad enough to start throwing his weight around while he was reasonaby functional.  A perfect storm seemed to be on the verge of wrecking Whig loyalism.

But of course Rothbard knows how the story ends, with a continental rather than an multi-continental empire.  According to the libertarian axioms which favor seccession and smaller polities this appears to make sense at first glance, but there are surely other considerations besides simple scale which should be weighed in the transition from British monarchism to American republicanism.  Though the libertarian impulse of the generation of ‘76 is unimpeachable, Rothbard knew quite well (from Charles Beard via Albert J. Nock) that the clique which drew up the constitution of 1787 was motivated by the expansion rather than the limitation of power.

The story that Rothbard is telling us, and it is true as far as it goes, is essentially a description of stasis…as stasis of states if you will.  First we have the British empire, followed by a libertarian interreginum from 1775-1788 under the states and the Articles of Confederation, followed by the American empire from 1789 onwards.  Or as Rothbard himself was apt to say, anarchy is desirable but inherently difficult to maintain because of the constant impulse in human nature towards aggression and “taking over” an even playing field.  Rothbard’s narrative is clearly superior to that of the standard textbooks in that he recognizes that the empire of post-1787 was no great improvement over the empire of pre-1775.  Yet this position is not as antipoidal to consensus thinking as it might seem.  A more radical stance would be to maintain that the empire initiated under the Federalists was actually worse than that of the British.  Certainly the evidence presented by the full sweep of Rothbard’s historiography point in that direction.  Why, in this instance, does our curmudgeonly historian so uncharacteristically pull his punches?

Whiggism=Manifest Destiny?

Rothbard’s glorification of Tom Paine’s republicanism contains a curious conflation of two sides of Whig ideology, in which he, perhaps unwittingly, weighs in on the wrong side.  The Whigs stood for private rights against public power, one formulation of which can be stated as “virtual independence under a figurehead king.”  However Whiggism also refers to a kind of historical theory which might be caracturized as “things are always getting better, never worse.”  Rothbard, quite rightly, rejects this second idea…that is, with the notable exception of the American separation from the British monarchy.  Naturally, from a rhetorical point of view, Rothbard like all political writers, could see the utility of taking a position which was flattering to the vanities of patriotism.  But is it objectively true that people were freer, or at least no less free, under the federal constitution than under the British monarchy?

Obviously measurements of degrees of freedom are suspect so I will restrict myself to a very impressionistic observation.   Since the late 18th century, the theory of rights which were expounded under the name of Whiggism, later liberalism, and still later libertarianism has undergone a mounting challenge from authoritarianisms of both the left and the right.  Is it not reasonable to consider, under such circumstances, that a wrong turn was made in Whig theory sometime during the 18th century and we have been living with its consequences ever since?

Yes, I would say there is, but I want to offer something more than just such a circumstantial arguement for “libertarian” monarchism.  I think that there are a priori grounds within the realm of social psychology which in some sense necessitate Whig monarchism as the framework for a free society.  Rothbard could not have seen this because, in spite of his intellegence which was so much greater than many, and certainly mine, his style of thinking didn’t allow him to pose the question in the right way.  His methodological individualism blinded him to the power of collective representations.  Methodological individualism is an absolute requirement of economic theory which deals with actions and transactions.  But a conflation of normative individualism with methodological individualism can hamper attempts to understand the way masses of people think.  Such thinking must be understood, if only so as to shown its own errors.  Then we will be closer to understanding why people love, or hate, monarchies.

A Certain Dangerous Animal

The novelist Lawrence Durrel once wrote something to the effect that, “Society is not a collection of individuals or a machine, it is an organism.  And like any animal, it becomes dangerous if its nature is not respected.”  In these sentiments Durrel was probably echoing a tradition in sociology that libertarians would prefer not to deal with: the French positivists of the 19th century.  I share in this distain for August Compt the founder of the movement, although to a far lesser extent his distant diciple Emile Durkheim.  The key notion of this school was “society worships itself.”  As a normative statement (and for Compt it was normative) this expresses the antithesis of liberalism.  However as a phenomenological description of how people think under concrete social conditions, it is remarkably accurate.

People, if left to their own devices, will worship themselves.  A perfectly isolated person, say a Renaissance magus living in a Gothic tower served by genii, will actually try to become a god.  In actual fact such cases are rare, if indeed they exist at all.  Normally people live in a social state, and they discover that if they don’t cooperate they are humbled.  However this humbling of the individual doesn’t lead to an abandonment of the self-deification impulse.  Rather this drive is transfered from the individual to the group.  Actually, since we are talking about thinking here, we are talking about the transfer of worship from a image of self, the “ego” (which may be a very selective appropriation of traits from the emprical self) to an image of the group (which liable to be even more selective).   Just as people don’t really relish thinking about what they physically and morally consist of, groups don’t worship themselves in the form of little particles called “others” (which would only draw attention to potential in-group competition).   Instead they form a collective representation of the group, and each individual directs the intentions of their thought towards that representation.  Ethnologists describing small scale traditional societies call these representations “totems.”  In a politically centralized  traditional society the totem becomes a person: a sacred king.

Since the sacred king is the collective representation of society as a whole, the system is open to all sorts of abuses which we can detect from the retrospective vantage point of Whig theory.  The king is liable to go from “being ” society as a colletive representation, to “owning” society as an individual.  Thus Joseph’s pharaoh, who wound up taking over all the grain in the kingdom, and later pharohs who even eslaved their stewards and their people.  Thus the oriental despots as described by Wittfoegel, who (thanks to control over irrigation) were able to turn their kingdoms into private farms.

European developments, and British developments in particular, mitigated against the worst of these abuses.  The theory which went along with this practice was, in the 18th century, designated Whiggism.  The idea was to roll back the power of the kings by denying them their sacred character and treating them as private individuals, who, for the sake of social peace were intrusted with sovereignty through a social compact.  Both their political and sacred duties became more and more attenuated.  Queen Ann was the last British monarch to cure people of scrofula by her touch (one of those she treated was the infant Samuel Johnson).

From this attenuation, the next logical step was abolition, which occured in America and France roughly around the same time.  Now if these revolutions had been accompanied by a corresponding transformation in human nature, such that a “new libertarian man” had come into existence, all would have been well.  This would have required, at the very minimum, that people in general give up thinking about social collectivities in abstract terms, and become nominalists.  This would have obviated conflicts between class and class, nation and nation.  Seeing reality as nothing but a collection of concrete entities, perhaps they could have worked out some sort of just exchange of scarce goods among themselves on a utilitarian basis.  But it didn’t happen, and people continued to apply abstract categories to social collectivities…and not just bare “humanity”…but also lesser divisions such as “England” and “France”  “the bourgoisee” “the Robertson family” etc.

It may seem that I am being rather draconian, or facetious, in my account of the period around the end of the 18th century, but there is circumstantial evidence to the effect that the most advanced thinkers of the times were indeed bothered by the obstructions which abstract thought put to the implimentation of scientific ends.  These people called themselves the “ideologists” a word which today has come to mean someone who expounds any special philosophical viewpoint, but in the original sense meant litterally the study of ideas as problematic.  The initially felt that their plans to reorganize society were being interfered with by a persistence of Platonism in popular thought, but in the end they were forced to realize that the human mind naturally deals with its environment through a process of abstraction.

Now this process of abstraction is both necessary and natural, but the delegation of collective representations to represent the group meant that the cupidity which is born in the individual was tranfered to society.  Now the nation took the place of the sacred king as the totem of the group.  From the begining of the 19th century socialism and nationalism increasingly became the religions of the masses.  A few masochisticly rigorous thinkers like August Compt could think their way through to a pure humanism abstracted from both the supernatural and class interests, but the majority were spoiling for a fight…and got it beyond their wildest dreams in the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, and the world wars of the 20th century.

New Country for Old Wiggs?

To sum up my argument for monarchism: it keeps societies from worshiping themselves.  From this self-worship comes the legitimacy of democratic appropriation of power from empirical society to the state, this latter being (amongst other things) the collective representation of society, society’s “ego” if you will.

If the world were made up of men like Murray Rothbard and Tom Paine, men who see everything in terms of concretes and methodological individualism, the world would be safe for republicanism.  But of course that is not the case, for ordinary people the republic becomes the god of society, the republic with all its symbols, its flag, its anthem, and its president with powers more vast than any king in history.

The only kind of state in which a stable and enduring system of personal and property rights could flourish is one in which the soverign was a private person.  This is not because having a soverign who is a private person is particularly safe, but because having a soverign who is a collective person is so manifestly dangerous.  I appeal to the 20th century as my evidence.

A word of caution is in order however.  Opponents of constitutional monarchy and private government always seek to tar legitimate monarchy with the brush of oriental despotism.  Their objections should not be dismissed hastily!  The history of the Napoleonic dynasty, not to mention many more “legitimate” houses in modernity, show that an unchanging human nature is still receptive to the archaic notion of the sacred king.

The god-men must not be allowed to return!  The kind of Whig monarchy which I am refering to could only be revived within the context of a Judeo-Christian culture.  Just as the monarchy should function as a sponge to absorbe the false pretentions of society towards divinity, so true religion must always be present to keep the person who has been entrusted with sovereignty from developing aspirations towards godhood.

Given these conditions there is nothing utopian about a Whig monarchy, indeed, I can’t think of any other libertarian constitution which would be less utopian.  Society would have no collective representation to generate irrational loyalty.  There would instead be two classes, the soverign and the subjects, each jealous of their own rights and checking the other.  The proof of this is non-utopian is that such societies, however imperfect, actually existed at one time, prior to the American and French revolutions.  The “utopian” sort of monarchism was the tyranical idealizing of men like Filmer, who wanted to revert the Christian monarchies of Europe back to something like the pharonic system.  Short of historical determinism, there is no reason why the Whig ideal of legally circumscribed monarchy shouldn’t have stabilized and continued.  Although the 18th century wasn’t quite a collection of proprietary communities in a strict Hoppean sense, and there was a great deal of economic and political chaos, the kings and queens, at least in Britain, were well on the way towards becoming private persons who simply happened to hold soverignty.  Sacred, realist thought was becoming restricted to theological objects, legal, nominalist thinking was starting to dominate the relations between royal houses and all the other legal persons in civil society.  As Someone  once said, that’s called “Rendering unto Ceasar what is Ceasar’s,  and to God what is God’s.”

April 18, 2008

This wasn’t supposed to happen in modernity

A Tale of Two Spectors

A spector is begining to haunt the world: mass hunger.  Actually two spectors for the price of one, and I’ll get around to the second spector further on, but for the moment hunger is quite terrifying enough:  Tony Karon of TIME magazine reports on Monday, April 14th:

Haiti is in flames as food riots have turned into a violent challenge to the vulnerable government; Egypt’s authoritarian regime faces a mounting political threat over its inability to maintain a steady supply of heavily subsidized bread to its impoverished citizens; Cote’D'Ivire, Cameroon, Mozambique, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Indonesia are among the countries that have recently seen violent food riots or demonstrations.  World Bank president Robert Zoellick noted last week that world food prices had risen 80% over the past three years, and warned that at least 33 countries face social unrest as a result.

This wasn’t supposed to happen in modernity: global trade, laws of comparative advantage in agriculture, the “Green Revolution” using genetic engineering, and a gradual slowing of the world’s population growth were supposed to have eliminated, not exacerbated, hunger.  What happened?  The author quoted above does not disapoint us by giving a list of causes for this remarkable, and tragic, phenomenon.

The social theories of Karl Marx were long ago discarded as of little value, even to revolutionaries.  But he did warn that capitalism has a tendency to generate its own crises.  Indeed, the spread of capitalism, and its accelerated industrialization and wealth-creation, may have formented the food-inflation crisis–by dramaticly accelerating the competition for scarce resources.

Tony Karon is evidently turning our attention to the “paradigm lost” of revolutionary Marxism, although the reasons subsequently adduced to explain the contemporary rise of hunger, while cogent, are not particularly Marxist.  If I may interpret and simplify what Karon said these boil down to two basic dynamics operating in the global food market:

1) Consumers with more disposable income are bidding out lower income consumers for food resources.  A farmer can make more money devoting land and capital to raise cattle for consumption than staple grains.

2) In addition to the previous factor, which is perrenial, a novelty has been introduced with the substitution of biofuel crops for consuption crops.

As someone once said, “What is to be done?”

I have no intention of challenging the accuracy of the preceeding analysis (except to say that it is based on standard microeconomic analysis, not, as Karon implies, Marxist theory).  When people in Haiti are eating mud patties obviously have a nightmare on our hands.  (Keep in mind that Haiti is virtually a protectorate of the United States, although presently under the guise of a United Nations stabilization mission.)   At this point solutions are more important that analyses of causes.  For the ethically minded there are two solutions which seem implied by the kind of analysis which Karon presents in the TIME article.  The first I shall call the guilty liberal solution and the second is the revolutionary Marxist solution.

#1 the guilty liberal solution:  This involves a cutback in consumption among populations with wealth to dispose on food.  Put in economic terms, markets for high-quality or gourmet foods are elastic in comparason to markets for staple foods.  If people will shift their food preferences down to less expensive items they will reduce the bidding pressure on food in general, aleviating hunger.

Objections to solution #1.  There might be all sorts of beneficial effects if wealthy populations were to consume less red meat etc., both morally and healthwise, but it is unlikely that this in itself would avert the hunger crisis.  To begin with it is based on the illusion of consumer soveriengty, that, in a statistical sense quantities on the market are automatically based on autonomous changes in consumer preferences.  Marie Antoinette moved from her palace to a bungalo, but this change in lifestyle didn’t prevent the outbreak of the French Revolution a few years later.  The masses couln’t eat the “cake” that Marie had forgone, and likewise the pastry that I forgoe at Starbucks dosn’t automatically show up on the plate of a child in Indonesia.  Moreover, for every person, who for whatever reason, desires to cut back on consumption, there are several emerging into affluence in the developing world who will increase their consuption of high-end goods.  Obviously a consuption end solution, however edifying, is not likely to improve the outlook for world hunger.   Which brings us to the demand side and…

#2 the socialization of agriculture.  If the world market rations food unfairly then it might be proposed that a system of relief should be instituted to eliminate hunger.   This could be done through agricultural subsidies and the mass adoption of food credit programs throughout the Third World.  Prices would cease to operate in the agricultural sector and instead of a market a commessariat system would produce and ship food to those in need.

Objections to #2: Unfortunately this would involve the abolition of property rights and ultimately all civil rights in participating countries.

Is there an escape from the two spectors of Hunger and an ensuing Tyranny based on demand for staples?

Yes, there is a libertarian solution, but it involves a notion of property rights which is often rejected by libertarians themselves.   All taxes should be abolished except taxes on land, and the right of homesteading should be extended to all people.  In the ensuing legal and taxation environment, land monopolies and agribussinesses would divest themselves of lands which cost them more in taxes than they accrued in income, and homesteaders would move onto the divested lands.  In this case an equilibrium could be established in land rights, which would be quickly followed by an equillibrium in the consuption and production of staples world wide.  At this point the dynamic of increasing productivity for consumables would shift to producers in the Third World who had migrated out of urban centers into the now newly attractive rural sectors.

Many people will consider this, which might be considered a neo-Georgist solution, to be quaint or reactionary or otherwise unattractive, but it is the most likely solution that I can think of for averting the twin spectors of hunger and collectivist tyranny.  Personally, I’ll take Henry George over Karl Marx any day!

April 18, 2008

Oops, a characteristic bit of self-Bowlderization

There was actally one more category in the “Tag Game” which I conveniently forgot to include: Name three (fortunately not five!) of your faults. Here goes…

Getting hopping mad (yes, I literally hop, which my wife calls “pyom pyom” which is Japanese onometopea for hopping) recently we have invested in a mini-trampoline which is supposed to help with the next fault as well.

Ingesting substances which make me fatter than I already am, from Guiness beer to those sticky sweet rolls they sell to go with your coffee at Starbucks.

The third is already in the title.  Forgetting.  Not just forgetting the rules to a blogging game, but forgetting to keep in contact with mentors and friends from the past…a severe fault when one is an expatriate from the country of one’s birth

April 18, 2008

Tagged

The Western Confucian “tagged me”…a game in which you blog:

What you were doing ten years ago

Five jobs you held in past

Five places you have lived in the past

Five things you plan to do to day

The five books one has most recently read

What one would do if one had a billion dollars

(one should then tage five other blogers):

What I was doing ten years ago:

The same thing I am doing today: Teaching at a nursing college in Japan

Five jobs I held in the past:

Lawnmowing boy,  library assistant, bookstore clerk, hotel desk clerk, translator (English:Japanese, unlicenced)

Five places I have lived in the past:

New Haven Conn., Gainesville FL,  Madison Wisconsin, Mannasas Va., Nara, Japan.

Five things I plan to do today:

Practice sound therapy techniques, attend the planing committe for my school’s spring festival, write and blog about “traditionalist anthropology,”  councel one or more students,  go home to my family and chill out

The last five books I have read:

Ted Andrew’s “The Healer’s Manual,”  Various editors “Introduction to the Works of Ignatius of Loyola,”  Ted Andrews “The Occult Christ,”  Richard Cantillon “Essay on the Nature of Commerce in General,”  John Le Carre “The Constant Gardiner”

What I would do if I had a billion dollars:

Establish an Institute for the Abolition of National Education Systems, the aim of which would be to show that all systems of national and compulsory education are a forms of involuntary servitude which promote nationalism and ultimately war.  On the positive side such an institute would encourage voluntary educational alternatives: homeschooling, apprenticeship programs, and private schools.

Others tagged: Pending

April 8, 2008

Modern Anthropology, the handmaiden of Naturalism

It has been noted that America’s culture wars are the byproduct of two clashing fundamentalisms: religious and secular.  While it is clear what text the Protestant defenders of religious fundamentalism base their world-views on, does Secular Fundamentalism have an equivalent text?  Well, yes and no.  Secular Fundamentalists (this is a polemical term for which I will henceforth substitute the more ontologically oriented category “Naturalism”) consider the entire corpus of modern science to be their “Bible”…and tout this as their strong point.  But in a narrower sense, a special category of texts (and they happen to be school texts) serves the cause of Naturalism in the vital role of” anti-antinaturalist” polemics.

Anti-antinaturlism seems to be an unnecessarily roundabout mode of expression, but I am using it to call into question the proceedure by which the secularist view was enthroned in academia.  Many religious reasoners, conflating  theology and anthropology, go wide of the mark when they talk about the marginalization of God in modern culture.  This marginalization, or the “Death of God” if one wants to dignify it with Nieztsechen rhetoric, is the end product (one might even say, the byproduct) of the inversion of Man and Nature in modern thought.

Specifically, Naturalism called upon an anti-anthropology (which we call simply anthropology today) to dethrone the category “Man” from ontological center stage.  Apart from careful students of Christian doctrine, this seemed initially to have no effect on theology.  “Nature and Nature’s God” was the siren call of 17th and 18th century Deism, which empasized the creative, rather than the incarnational, attributes of Deity.  In the old “hermetic” science which prevailed in Europe prior to circa 1600, the key formulas: Logo=Athropos, Macroprosperos=Microsprosperos, etc. highlighted Human Being as paradigmatic of all Being.  Although being a hermetic scientist didn’t commit one to being a Christian, hermetic formulas could be translated into Christian theology, and vice versa, with great economy and coherence.  This ended with the rise of naturalism.

If, however, naturalism was to permanently evict Humanism, in both its Christian and Hermetic forms, from the learned counsels of Europe, it would have to develop an apologetic dicipline dedicated to diminishing any and all claims to human uniqueness and priority in the scheme of creation.  This is the anti-anthropology which eventually became established in American and European departments of “Anthropology.”  The textbooks of these apologetics, i.e. “Basic Anthropology Texts” are as close as one is likely to come in identifying a secularist Bible.

Now one of the ways in which this secularist “Bible” is more fanatical than its Christian counterpart consists in the fact that it is revised every year, presumably with the intention of profiting the publisher and the author, but also with the equally clear intention of becoming more and more orthodox, that is to say naturalistic and anti-anthropological.  I refuse to abet the process by buying or using these “upgraded” texts…although I will admit that there are bound to be some exceptions to the overall secular tendency towards naturalism, value inversion, and political correctness.

Indeed, I am proud to say that at my last inventory, the most recently published general anthropology text in my library happened to be Ember and Ember’s ANTHROPOLOGY edition of 1981.  Of course this is way too late to avoid the ravages of naturalism…but it at least has a sporting good faith in the reader’s dicernment and ability to recognize contradictions.  It begins in a truely remarkable way:

Anthropology defines itself as a dicipline of infinite curiosity about human beings.

This is a “curious” statement indeed!  As it stands it would seem to indicate that “anthropology” is nothing more than a passtime…infinite research done with no goal of attained results in mind.  However that this is not precisely what Ember and Ember are getting at is made clear in the next statement which states:

Needless to say, the many other diciplines concerned with humans would not be happy to be regarded as as subbranches of subbranches of anthropology. [they have previously listed sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history, human biology, philosophy, and literature.]

But one suspects that this has less to do with departmental jealousy, than the fact that these diciplines could be grouped together as “The Human Sciences” but for the existence of a competing science of “anthropology” which dooms them to an ad hoc, disjointed existence.  And what does this “anthropology” consist of?  According to Ember and Ember, its core(s) are constituted by ethnography, comparative linguistics, and human biology (especially osteology).  These are the odds and ends seemingly left out after all the other human studies formed themselves into separate diciplines.  This, of course, begs the question…why weren’t these raised to an equal rank of studies?  This is in itself “curious”…but then Ember and Ember add a final  twist to their definition which makes things “more curiouser” than even Alice’s view through the looking glass:

Another distinguishing feature of anthropology is its holistic approach to the study of human beings.

Yet how can this anthropology be “holistic” if it is a holism which excludes, on principle, sociology, psychology, political science, economics etc.?  Clearly the reason for dividing the human sciences into the aforesaid diciplines on the one hand and “anthropology” on the other, has nothing to do with the intrinsic characteristics of their repective subject matter.  But it has everything to do with eliminating the category, not to mention the primacy, of the human race in nature.  Keep in mind the contrast of  anthropology’s classic definition as “the study of man [in contemporary idiom 'human beings']” with Evans and Evans “a dicipline of infinite curiosity about human beings.”  Even at the risk of being considered frivolous, Evans and Evans have taken the bull by the horns and indicated that they do not think that there is such a thing as a “human species” which is subject to a general definition.  As such they are to be applauded for their candor, if not their humor!

These suspicions are augmented  when we look at the diciplines which have been isolated from the other human sciences and pressed into the service of a naturalist apologetic.  The fall into two, or perhaps three categories:

1) diciplines which show the human race to be entirely embedded within nature.  The naturalist appolgetic here is to show that the causes of all effects, even those governing psychical events, are ultimately based on the movements of inchohate matter.

2) diciplines which show the  unity of the human race to be an accident of genetic continuity.  The naturalistic appologetic here is to show that calls for universal benevolence must be based on biology and nothing but biology.

3) diciplines which show the autonomy and particularity of local cultures.  The naturalistic appologetic here is to show that, if indeed there is such a thing as “spirit”…even so it is limited to specific groups.  To the extent that one wishes to dissent from naturalism one must take on the onus of being a nationalist or a racist.  To the extent that one wishes to be cosmopolitan one must embrace naturalism.

Since is precisely these disciplines, or rather paradigms, which are gathered together as “anthropology” one can hardly escape the observation, in spite of the humor and tact of Embers and Embers, that the way in which the diciplinary lines have been drawn reflects more than simple ad hockery.  In fact modern “anthropology” has clearly been established with the intent of marginalizing the idea of Human Nature, and replacing it with an unqualified Nature of which humanity is no more than an epiphenomenon.

I am using Evans and Evans as an illustration of a typical introductory anthropology text of the late 20th century, one which on the whole is better written and less subject to poltical hackery than most, and certainly subsequent, publications in the genre.  None the less, I can’t resist a small, but significant, retrospective joke at their expense.  Evans and Evans ask:

What induces the anthropologist to choose so broad a subject for study?  In part, he or she is motivated by the belief that any generalization made about human beings should be shown to be applicable to many times and places of human existence.  For example, before Margaret Mead embarked on her famous field study of the people of Samoa (which was later reported in her Coming of Age in Samoa, 1928) many Americans believed that adolescence was necessarily a period of “storm and stress” because of the physiological changes that occur in puberty.  However, on the basis of her observations of Samoan adolecents, who did not seem to show signs of emotional upheaval, Mead concluded that the Western belief about adolecence was not universally applicable and was therefore subject to question.  The clear implication to be drawn from her work was that emotional stress in adolecence was not universally applicable and was therefore subject to question.

The above text (1981) would have been dated only a few years later with the publication of Derek Freeman’s exposure of Mead’s faulty research.  She was apparently taken in by adolecent girls who wowed her with tales of fictitious liasons.  However Evans and Evans couldn’t have known about this research at the time, since Freeman was waiting for the decease of the much respected Mead to release his criticisms (whether out of fear or respect is itself a subject of debate).

What Evans and Evans can be held responsible for are the stated motives which “induce the anthropologist” to contradiction.  We are told that that any generalization about culture should be made “applicable to many times and places of human existence” which is a movement towards generalization, the universal, or what some philosophers of science have called the nomothetic.  But in fact Mead purports to show that one supposedly universal attribute of human development “adolecent stress” is culturally, that is locally, optional.  In doing so human nature is replaced by many different human natures, which is precisely the opposite of the program outlined by Evans and Evans.   After giving lip service to universalism, a particularist conclusion is reached.  This is, of course, in persuit of the third, and possibly the second, variety of naturalistic appologetic indicated above.  This kind of programmatic contradiction would have betrayed an anti-anthropic bias even if it had not been falsified by the debunking of Mead’s research.

Going back to a previous generation of Anthropological texts, I can’t help but feel there is much more substance in a book, however crabbed and user unfrendly, as Penneman’s ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ANTHROPOLOGY (1965).  Although later in time, Penneman is the sort of person who probably could have written a respectable article for the eleventh edition of Enclyclopedia Britannica.  The “one hundred years” refers to the great divide between naturalistic and traditional anthropology…the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species.  Penniman is, of course, a Darwinian…but not a vicious supporter natural selection, biologism, or the reign of the ubermenchen.  While he is clearly no friend of religion, this is more the kind of stock English Deist quibbling, and his Ruskinesk love of agrarian details shows that he was dragooned into scientism more through scruples than conviction.

Although Penniman’s HUNDRED YEARS is more of a bibliography than a book, it waxes poetic at critical moments.  None of these is more important than the tribute he gives to Darwin, who was, if not the inventor, at least the enabler, of modern anthropology.  Knee-jerk anti-evolutionists would do well to consider the fact that Darwin was in no way “evil” but, as Penneman explains, his very conservatism and modesty gave a false veneer of probity to the radically inhuman theory of “natural selection.”  In this respect he is somewhat like Marx, the most libertarian of the German socialists, who’s idealism honey-coated the bleak historical determinism that we today know as “Marxism.”

Penneman’s anthropological world is much more genteel and erudite than what became of the dicipline after it was invaded, first by bohemians and then by leftists.  None the less, it is a scientistic world, one in which all phenomena are neatly classified and arranged in museum boxes.  In this post-Darwinian world “man” is no more speical than the occupyer of any other box, be it the chambered nautulus or the armadillo.  To get back to a time when Anthropology was something more than anti-anthropology masquerading as curiosity, one has to get well back before the great divide of 1859.

The last great system of thought before Darwin was that of Hegel, whom few today can relish.  None the less his usage of the term “Anthropology” is interesting in so far as it is transitional between the hermetic Logos=Anthropos=Cosmos formulations and later positivistic notions.  One could do worse than to take as one’s textbook on human nature the third part of Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences: Philosophy of Mind.  In it one would find a surprising identification of anthropology with pneumatology.  Moreover it is a pnuematology which, unlike classical systems, is divested of nous (=speculative mind).  How can one account for this strange, dialectical inversion?  Perhaps Hegel was trying to make good on his claims to being “scientific”…he was defending his Idealism against the materialists by showing that idealisms were not inherently cognitivist, but could assign a foundatinal place to sentience.  Hence the strange equation of sentience with the soul, and the soul with human nature.  This is not as bad as it seems from a traditionalist point of view, since Hegel’s Absolute encompasses nature, rather than vice versa.  Still, it is rather shocking and a deviation from perrenial thought.

Which brings one to the final question: how far back into history do we have to go in order to retrieve a “real” anthropology book, one that has not been infected by naturalism?  According to traditionalist thinkers there were times in the past when a basic consensus in metaphysical speculation prevailed.  Rene Guenon claims that the “modern deviation” began in the fourteenth century, while other people claim someone as late as Leibniz (fl. 1700) is solidly in the perenial philosophy…a term which he coined.

Rather than giving any clear response to that question, I would like to end on a cautionary note.  I have been cautioning against anthropology being the handmaiden of naturalism, but that doesn’t mean that there no cylla to this charibdis.  Secularist fundamentalism is ugly, but so is religious fundamentalism.  One risk of buying into the perrenial philosophy which must frame any viable theology, anthropology, and cosmology, is the trap of thinking that thought cannot develop.  Thought can, and should develop…however it is the thesis of traditionalists that thought has, for a long time, been developing on the basis of specious principles.  These principles have to be utterly revoked, but having once set out on the basis of a sure foundation, thinking can raise a sounder ediface.  In traditionalist thinking man is not “a part of” nature.  Rather God, Man, and Cosmos interpenetrate and participate in each other.  This notion is literally “unthinkable” to most people today…especially those of a fundamentalist bent, be they religious or secular.  One of the barriers to making it “thinkable” is the modern anthropology text, that bible of naturalist non-men.

March 27, 2008

Why Paleoconservatives Should Support Solidarity With Tibet

The Untimeliness of an Anti-Politically Correct Correctness

Tibet is on fire, but in spite of what one might presume their natural sympathies to be, libertarians and paleoconservatives have been soft-pedaling their support for the uprising. As a good example of this see the generally perspicacious Justin Raimondo’s article “Why They Hate China” at Anti-War.com. The primal logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has asserted itself, the enemy in question being, of course, the neoconservatives and their next target (after making a mess of the Middle East) presumably being China. Far be it for the Nousprakikon to advocate an intensification of the already chilling Sino-American cold war. I will offer no suggestions as to how one might support the Tibetan people without causing friction between world powers, although I hope someone has ideas to that effect. No, I simply want to point out, for the benefit of paleoconservatives in particular, that this is what a true “civilizational conflict” looks like…that the Han/Tibetan crisis is located across the most significant fault line in human history, that which separates traditionalist from modernist views of reality. As such the Tibetans deserve, at the very least, our sympathy…even if we must remain agnostic in relation to what political modalities might save them from cultural genocide.

Hermetic sympathy for a Hermit Kingdom?

Tibetans are isolated from the sympathy of most of the human race due to the circumstance of their religion, which to the uninitiated 99% of mankind seems “weird” i.e. esoteric and alien. Be that as it may, until the recent outbreaks the problems of Tibet received short shrift in the international media in contrast to supposedly graver problems elewere in the world. The apocalyptic expression “civilizational conflict” has been employed almost excursively to tensions between the post-Christian West and the Muslim middle east. However in a broader perspective this fight is little more than an ethnic or sectarian conflict acted out on a grand scale. Islam and Christianity are close enough that they can engage in mutual theological polemics, and it is arguable that secularized individuals of ether faith have little sympathy with revivalist movements in their own countries other than a generalized ethnic affinity.

However the conflict in central Asia between the Tibetan people and the Chinese state is a kind of tectonic friction between modernity and an archaic substrata, i.e., much more of a civilizational conflict in the pure sense of the term. In this case it is less important who is the aggressor and who is the victim, than the essential rectitude or otherwise, of the values in conflict. It has been pointed out by libertarian commentators that in past centuries the “Tibetans” (in the form of a priest cast) were aggressors, or at least collaborators in aggression, in serving as the religious experts of several Chinese dynasties. The determination of who is the aggressor and who is the victim is a matter of empirical jurisprudence about which historians and journalists will have much to say. I am only speaking as a traditionalist who asserts the value of archaic culture over modernity as something to be defended in its own right. This is, almost by definition, an unpopular viewpoint, especially when it is offered as a bare phenomenological judgement…one which precinds from any sort of ethnic, racial, religious, or sectarian affinity. Obviously if the reader is a Tibetan Buddhist these arguments will seem superfluous, while for the sympathetic “liberal” they will seem absurd, for, in contrast to the latter I am not making an argument from the principle of toleration or pluralism. No, I am saying (echoing Kierkegaard) that it is a matter of either/or: either archaic civilization or modernity is an illusion…they cannot both be true.

Note that I am talking values rather than corpses here. As harsh as the Chinese repression may become, I doubt that it will lead to the extinction of the Tibetans as a race. What we are talking about is cultural genocide: assimilation, secularization, and forced development. From the point of view of relativism there is nothing tragic in this, after all, populations can change cultures as easily as individuals can change clothes. But the traditionalist view is quite different, its staunchly claims that some cultures are metaphysically correct while others are metaphysically defective. This is the only weapon that the paleoconservative has to fight the rival neoconservative and progressive notions of “political correctness.” Tibet may indeed succumb to cultural genocide, but this will be a tragic death, not an instantiation of the frivolous “culture change” routinely touted by secular anthropology. Admittedly, without a sensitive understanding of the relation between culture and metaphysics, it is hard to see what is at issue here.

The traditionalist principle of metaphysical correctness

It is possible to conceive of the world being ideologically divided into two camps of secularists and religionists. However this is generally not done, for while the secularists may share a general consensus on indifference to metaphysics, religions are scrupulous in their adherence to specific points of doctrine. Why, for example, should a Christian or a Muslim have any sympathy for a Tibetan Buddhist, simply because the latter is in some way “religious”? Why indeed? Again, the easy answer would involve the trivialization of doctrinal differences…a sort of happy ecumenical holding of hands and singing “kumbaya.” This, however, is not the traditionalist view.

The traditionalist view is that any religion, if it contains any truth whatsoever, must be based on certain metaphysical propositions. Having this fundamental metaphysical correctness may not be sufficient to constitute the “true religion”…but it is absolutely necessary. This posting is not an appropriate place to go into a detailed enumeration of the propositions which go into a “correct” or “traditional” metaphysic…and to tell the truth such a metaphysic is not so much constructed out of propositions as compounded by intuitions. It has been called “the perennial philosophy” but in fact it is nothing like what is called philosophy in contemporary departments of Western-style philosophy. One of the greatest of the exponents of traditionalism Rene Guenon, made this quite explicit in his work Man and His Becomings according to the Vedanta. Let’s just be content to say that in the true tradition which underlies all genuine religiosity the human sensory world is only one small sphere within an array of intangible worlds, or what is in vulgar parlance simply tossed into a portmanteau category called “the supernatural.”

In contrast to the naturalist and materialist world-view, where the function of the cosmos is to be sacrificed to human use, the metaphysics of tradition sees the most noble human action in a sacrifice to something greater than empirical humanity. Naturally, the effect and appropriate modalities of these sacrifices is a matter of significant difference between religions, and non-relativizing thought presumes that here too there must be a hierarchy of approximation to truth. However even before this question (i.e.: whether Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. corresponds to the truest doctrine) arises, the sad reality must be faced that those moderns who call, and even earnestly believe themselves to be “Christians” “Buddhists” or whatever have no notion of traditional metaphysics. Therefore, as per the premise stated above, they would be better designated as pseudo-Christians, pseudo-Buddhists, and so forth…and thus disqualified from investigation into which religion best expressed the traditional metaphysic…as much so as the avowed atheists and materialists who’s premises they unknowingly share.

Conclusion: Tibet vs. China

Remarkably, Tibetan Buddhism, on the whole, remains grounded in “the tradition” or “the perennial philosophy” or whatever one wishes to call it. I wont enumerate any empirical evidence for this here, there are plenty of examples for those who take the time to investigate. As such Tibet, as a culture, has an absolute value for the rest of humanity, not simply as an exotic ethnic specimen, but as a remaining archaic outcrop of “the tradition” which was once the universal “background noise” of all human cultures.

Across the great divide looms the opposite “truth” which, if I and my fellow traditionalists were wrong in our “Pascalian wager” would have to be saluted as the winning cause in the either/or proposition of value absolutism. It is the cause of all which promotes utility, progress, and rationalism. It is not even really “Chinese” though the contemporary Chinese mainstream has become enthralled to it. It has been stripped of Confucian ethics and Marxian egalitarianism…an amoral movement for power and expansion surging from the cities of the eastern seaboard into Central Asia. If it is anything, it is a kind of Asian doppelganger of America…and those who counsel against needlessly antagonizing it speak well.

None the less, those of us who value cultural conservatism should lament the passing of Tibet…and support whatever means, short of abetting an extension of American power into Central Asia, of delaying the demise of a great and sagacious people. Yet even in the best scenario, it may be that the Tibetans, like Tolkien’s elves “are not long for the circles of this world.” If so, and even if it is a cultural rather than a physical exodus, those of us who remain on this rock orbiting through the space of secular time will be immensely impoverished.

December 21, 2007

A Political Movement

 From Nouspraktikon to F of RP in J==>

I am moving all my political commentary, and that means Ron Paul stuff in particular over to a new blog “Friends of Ron Paul in Japan.”

That will free up this blog for my musings on philosophy, religion, and social thought….when and if I get around to it.  With the primaries still a moving target in the US (Florida moved up to Jan. 31st…and now may move back to Feb. 5th) not only is the political system a mess, but the window of opportunity for doing anything about it is rapidly drawing to a close as the new year looms.  So I shall be devoting such meager energies and influences as I possess to the Ron Paul cause in the immediate future.  I implore anyone reading this to do the same.

December 20, 2007

America’s Tragedy: Less trancendence, more nihilism

The steady eye of a man who was a disciple of both Hippocrates and Moses describes the fateful decline of transcendent values in America and his fear of ensuing consequences.

I got this from New Oxford reveiw…but it seems to have been publishes elsewhere.  And as long ago as 1994!

A Jewish View:  America, a Christian country?

David C. Stolinsky, M.D., lives in Los Angeles, and is semi-retired after 25 years of medical school teaching at the University of California at San Francisco and the University of Southern California.

Some time ago a Southern governor referred to the United States as “a Christian country.” The media were unanimous in their denunciation, while my liberal and Jewish friends derided him as a bigot and a fool. My reaction was a bit different. When I first heard his description of this country, I thought, “What an optimist!” Perhaps my and my family’s background can explain my attitude.

My mother was born in Russia just before the turn of the century. Her most vivid memory of early childhood was the pogrom of 1905. She and her fam­ily were hidden for three days in the home — at times under the table — of a friendly Christian family. The woman of the house placed icons in the window to make clear to the mob that it was not a Jewish home. My grandfather, a rabbi, had to be restrained from rushing outside in his unwillingness to be saved by images of Jesus and the saints. Nevertheless, the family was unhurt, while persons they knew were beaten to death. My mother was too young to have any memory other than fear. An older brother felt discomfort at the sound of church bells for the rest of his life. His memory of the pogrom starting in the churchyard overcame his memory of being saved by Christians. Soon after, the family emigrated to the U.S. After a brief stay on the Lower East Side, they settled in North Da­kota, where my mother attended the university.

My father was born in the area of Poland that was ruled by the Czar. The hatred to which he and his peers were subjected was returned in kind. The older boys taught him to spit when passing a church — surreptitiously, of course. His most salient memory of later childhood was seeing notices for jobs or places at the university, all of which ended with the proviso “Except Jews.” Unwilling to serve in the army that supported such a system, he emigrated to New York as a teenager. He arrived with no money, no knowl­edge of English, and no high school diploma. He still managed to put himself through school, while taking time off to serve — proudly — as a private in the in­fantry in France in World War I. He later applied to various medical schools, where admission for Jews was limited by quotas. Ultimately, he was admitted to the University of North Dakota, where he met and married my mother. At the time it was a two-year medical school, and for the additional two years my father transferred to St. Louis University, a Jesuit school.

My parents set up medical practice in Lisbon, North Dakota, a town of 2,000 inhabitants — in those days one said “souls” — and at length my mother became pregnant. The obstetrician informed them that a Caesarian section would be needed. My father decided to take her to the hospital where he had in­terned. It was a Catholic hospital, but my father had been well treated, and he trusted the people there. Things went well, and I was born. All in all, this was not a bad outcome for the little girl who hid under the table and the little boy who spat when passing churches.

My parents came from the generation that was trying to get away from Europe and everything that went with it, so the lack of formal religion did not bother them so long as I was small. When I was in first grade, a classmate was killed by a car and the class attended the funeral, so the first house of worship I entered was a Protestant church. I participated in the school Christmas program and sang about the “Mergin Mary.” I recall my parents’ mixed reaction, but they needn’t have worried — eventually I became bar mitzvah and married the granddaughter of a rabbi. I recall no school prayers, but strict honesty was required, and — although I was unaware of it then — a religious basis for ethics was assumed. The U.S. entered World War II when I was seven years old. Wishing to contribute to the war effort, my father ap­plied to the Veterans Administration and was as­signed to Boise, Idaho. Here he and a colleague set up a Jewish Sunday School in our home. We held Friday night services in the small Reform Temple, which was unused during the year. However, it was used for the High Holidays, so our little Conservative congrega­tion rented the meeting room of the Mormon Temple. Thus I was introduced to my religion in a uniquely American way.

After the war my family settled in San Francisco and joined a Conservative congregation, so my reli­gious experience took a more conventional form. Still, my parents wanted to expose me to a variety of experiences, and we frequently attended Reform or Orthodox services. In those days the Reform and Or­thodox movements had not yet moved to opposite poles, and religious centrists had many options. We could attend a Reform service and hear a sermon, not a liberal political speech, or my father and I could at­tend an Orthodox service and sit with my mother. In addition, our rabbi occasionally invited guests to preach at Friday night services; one of these was a black minister whose beautiful sermons I still recall. Besides, I sometimes watched Bishop Sheen on tele­vision and listened to “The Old-Fashioned Revival Hour” on radio, and once my parents took me to Mid­night Mass on Christmas Eve.

My parents sent me to public junior and senior high schools, which I attended via public transporta­tion, and without fear. The worst thing that happened during those six years was a fight in which a friend of mine slipped and cut his head on the shower-room floor. Many of us carried knives to school — Boy Scout knives — but there was not one stabbing or shooting. The “bad boys” smoked cigarettes, drank beer, and fooled around with the “bad girls.” Those who smoked between classes chewed breath mints so the teachers wouldn’t smell tobacco on their breath. Drugs were unknown. And this was no suburban lo­cale; I attended middle-class schools with multiethnic student bodies.

Besides parents and teachers, I enjoyed the ben­efit of positive role models from the media. First there was radio, with Captain Midnight, Tom Mix, and Gang Busters, narrated by H. Norman Schwarzkopf Sr. Later came television, with Science in Action, the U.S. Steel Hour, and Playhouse Ninety. Most of all, there were the movies, where I absorbed every­thing from The Story of Louis Pasteur, The Story of Pierre and Marie Curie, and The Magic Buffet to Ser­geant York, They Died With Their Boots On, Gunga Din, and Fort Apache. Today things are different. In­stead of Pasteur, who overcame the establishment to fight for truth, or York, who overcame pacifism to fight for freedom, we have rap stars who glorify vio­lence but fight for nothing. And instead of the chap­lain praying with wounded soldiers in The Fighting Sixty-Ninth, the myriad deaths depicted today are usually meaningless, and the dying or bereaved never pray. Religious persons are shown as fanatical bigots, while clergy appear only to perform exorcisms. Those expressing patriotic sentiments are often shown as rednecks, and veterans as unstable alcoholics. Happi­ness is equated with having fun, and is shown to come from money and possessions rather than inner qualities. It is untrue that today’s media are not edu­cational — it’s just that the lessons have changed.

As an early teenager I was painfully shy around girls, so I would loiter at the newsstand and sneak looks at “girlie” magazines until the clerk shooed me away. In those days, girlie magazines featured full-fig­ure shots of smiling young women in bathing suits or lingerie. Now, of course, such magazines are filled with full-page crotch shots and are sold in supermar­kets, where pre-teen boys can show them to each other and say, as one did in my presence, “F– her brains out.” Perhaps I was lucky to have had my men­tal image of a woman formed by pictures of a whole woman, not just a crotch. Perhaps this has some­thing to do with the increasing rates of teenage preg­nancy, divorce, and violence against women. Perhaps visualizing a woman as a depersonalized crotch is not conducive to a lifelong, caring relationship.

Despite the absence of prayer, religion of a sort was taught in the public schools — Americanism. In my early school years, the war and immediate post­war period made patriotism and a sense of unity an unexpressed but understood subtext to everything that happened. In high school I took ROTC. Our instructors were master sergeants who were World War II veterans with multiple rows of decorations and campaign ribbons. Even the rowdiest boys paid them respect. We knew to whom we owed our freedom. American History and Civics courses emphasized the values of our Founding Fathers. A history text did in­clude a chapter entitled “The Age of Imperialism,” but in general our nation was viewed positively. Those who wished to attend Hebrew School or Chinese School after school hours, or to attend parochial schools, did so, but no one expected the public schools to teach anything but general American val­ues and culture. That was a big enough job. On the other hand, foreign languages were required, unlike many of today’s “multicultural” high schools.

Each year we had a beautiful Christmas pro­gram that happened to be directed by a Catholic priest, so I came to appreciate “Oh Come All Ye Faith­ful” in Latin. The announcement of the program al­ways included the proviso that those who did not wish to attend could go to the library, so no one felt compulsion. Christmas vacation was at least as wel­come as the modern “winter break.” Graduation ceremonies from junior and senior high included prayers. One was offered by a minister who caused me discomfort by mentioning Jesus Christ; the other was offered by a rabbi. Following graduation I attended the University of California at Berkeley and spent the vast majority of my time studying, as did most of my friends. We were aware that marijuana existed, but cigarettes, booze, and girls were temptation enough. There were Marxist professors, but as a rule they were unobtrusive, and my studies were not interrupted by a single demonstration or sit-in. I recall the annual Charter Day ceremonies, which closed with the Uni­versity Hymn:

Oh God our help in ages past
Our hope for years to come
Our shelter from the stormy blast
And our eternal home.

Somehow this didn’t upset me or my Jewish friends. The speaker at one Charter Day was Chief Justice Earl Warren. Apparently it didn’t upset him either — I believe he joined in the singing. Have we really advanced since those days?

I attended medical school in San Francisco. The third-year courses were at the old County Hospital, where we were thrown into patient-care duties. A vivid memory is of the emergency room, where a young boy was brought by ambulance. He had been hit by a car and was in coma. I was given the task of shaving his head in preparation for surgery. As I was doing so, the Catholic chaplain arrived and, since the boy was in the uniform of the Catholic schools, began to administer the Last Rites. As I clumsily shaved away, the priest accidentally touched my hand with the holy oil. We said nothing to each other, but through his Latin prayer we somehow communi­cated our joint efforts to help the boy in our different ways. The boy eventually died; the priest’s way proved to be the more beneficial.

On another occasion, a cardiac patient was do­ing poorly and his minister was called. The Protestant prayers sufficed to move to tears a young nurse I knew to be a devout Catholic. During the long nights on call, a stethoscope sometimes hit an oxygen tank and made a bell-like sound. Somehow this reminded me of the little bell the altar boy rang to alert worship­ers to important parts of the Mass. Of course, bells no longer accompany Mass, which is no longer said in Latin, and oxygen is piped in, so there are no more bell-like sounds in the middle of the night to remind us that a hospital is a holy place.

Later I specialized in medical oncology, which at the beginning involved trying new treatments on patients with far-advanced cancer. Frequently I came in Sunday morning to make rounds. Our hospital was a small branch of the County Hospital, but somehow the First Amendment allowed Sunday church ser­vices to be held in the sun room at the end of our ward. Patients in wheelchairs and on gurneys crowded the hallway to participate. Often I would squeeze past them while the minister preached or led in singing hymns. A black Baptist minister alternated with a Korean Methodist; what their singing lacked in musical ability was more than made up for by genuine emotion. It was an unforgettable experience to care for my patients in that atmosphere.

In medical-school lectures and later in medical journals, discussion of medical ethics invariably began with Hippocrates and frequently included the Bible, Maimonides, and the Church Fathers. Slowly these references disappeared, and for at least a decade they have been virtually absent.

A leading medical journal published three ar­ticles advocating medical euthanasia — that is, ac­tual killing of patients by their physicians. Another article discussed the Dachau experiments, in which Nazi doctors submerged prisoners in ice water, sup­posedly to discover how to aid flyers downed in the North Sea. Each time, I submitted a letter to the edi­tor, noting that the authors justified euthanasia. None of the four letters was published. Upon enquiry, the editor replied that even brief references to God or Hippocrates (“I will give no deadly medicine…”) would not be published because they were “not interesting” and because they represented merely an “ap­peal to authority.” Apparently, the editor did not rec­ognize that in advocating medical killing, the authors were simply substituting themselves as the authority.

In short, in reply to the Southern governor I would say, “Is America a Christian country? I doubt it — but I grew up in one.” The country that gave shel­ter (not welcomed, gave shelter) to my parents, despite their being Jewish, did so because its people were religious. If one doubts this, let him notice that religious groups lead the fight for continued immi­gration today. Clearly, religious people can be bigots and worse, as history shows. But in a nation de­scended from immigrants, where no group has a majority, religion tended toward tolerance rather than bigotry. In past years, Catholics and Jews had discrimination in common, and now fundamental­ists are among Israel’s strongest supporters. This is not to say that my family experienced no bigotry. One of the professors who interviewed me for medical school insisted that I had an accent, and he did not mean a Midwestern one. My father was not always accepted by other physicians, or my mother by other teachers. Still, the overall effect of living in a Christian country was beneficial for us.

Those who believe that all anti-Semitism is religious in nature ignore the obvious fact that 19 centu­ries of pogroms, expulsions, and autos-da-fé still left six million Jews for a secular dictatorship to annihi­late in 12 years. Hitler built on this long history of re­ligious-based bigotry, but what does this mean? It means that hatred, which for almost two millennia had been propagated by religion yet held in check by religious scruples, was released in its full fury by a post-Christian, essentially pagan state. The decline of American Christianity thus makes me quite uneasy. What hatreds or other repressed evils will surface when the restraint of religion weakens still further? Moreover, our complaint against the Churches during the Nazi era is that they interfered too little in politics. Luckily, there was no G.C.L.U. (German Civil Liber­ties Union) to block even these efforts. But at precisely what point should the Churches have interfered? Clearly, it was far too late by the time the mass depor­tations had begun. To have any hope of being effec­tive, protests must begin when the situation is still ambiguous and controversial, and thus reversible. Those who object to American Churches opposing abortion or euthanasia should keep this in mind: To paraphrase Pastor Niemöller, if no one speaks up against abortion or euthanasia, there may be no one left to speak up against something worse. Churches are rather like the police — we must put up with traf­fic tickets if we expect their help when killers break into our homes.

Despite all this, many of my liberal and Jewish friends continue to fight old battles. Like my uncle, they remember the church bells, not the rescuers. They react reflexively against anything remotely suggesting a connection between religion and the na­tion. There are no more prayers at school graduations. Are the graduates any better for it? The Univer­sity Hymn is no longer sung at Berkeley. Are the stu­dents or professors any happier or better? Nativity scenes no longer appear on city hall lawns. Are anti-Semitic incidents less frequent? A Democratic Party official refers to the unborn child as a “blob of jelly.” Are women safer or more respected? A film involving a sexual relationship between an adult male and a 12-year-old boy is reviewed as “controversial.” Will the “controversy” be settled by lowering the age of con­sent to 12, as some propose? Pornography in its grossest forms is readily available. Are sexual prob­lems less common? Grammar school children are taught details of condom use and homosexuality. Do teenagers have an easier time finding their identities? Films, television, and music videos overflow with sex and violence, often combined. Do they produce bet­ter or happier people?

Children grow up without being taught that anything is sacred. Is it likely that they will later come to appreciate the significance of a marriage certifi­cate, an oath of office, or a contract, much less a handshake? All the litigation generated by 800,000 American lawyers will not suffice to repair the resulting damage. Value-free education produces value-free graduates. Why are we surprised that criminals roam free? An assistant chief of police is driven from office because he consulted with fellow church members before carrying out an order he questioned. Do citi­zens feel safer from police abuses? Marriage is dis­couraged by welfare and tax policies. Are we unaware that criminals are more likely than not to have grown up without a father in the house? Medical journals assert that doctors may kill their patients under vaguely defined circumstances, and 46 percent of California voters agree. In the Netherlands, cited by advocates of euthanasia as a model, over one thou­sand patients annually are killed by their doctors without their consent. For the old or poor or disabled, this maybe troubling. In an era of health-care ration­ing, it should be.

Only a few years ago, if a person was found ly­ing on the sidewalk, someone would stop to help. The only exception was skid row on Saturday night, when drunkenness was common. Now hardly any­one stops, even at midday in the “best” neighbor­hoods. Homelessness, drug abuse, and AIDS are common, and no one wants to get involved. Besides, civil libertarians have taught us that autonomy is the highest value. Stepping over a prostrate indi­vidual truly expresses how highly we value au­tonomy, at least our own. It says less for the value we place on human life, and still less for the example we are giving our children and the society we are leaving for them. A study of non-Jews who rescued Jews during the Holocaust showed that rescuers tended to have a strong religious background and sense of community. We seem to be doing our best to rid our society of such persons. One can only hope that we will need them again.

Even the Boy Scout Oath is under attack. What is wrong with teaching young people to do their duty to God and country, in that order? Perhaps that is the key point. Perhaps that is what irritated the editor of the medical journal. We may soon live in a country where nothing, especially God, comes before what we want, or what the experts want, or what the govern­ment wants. Despite my friends’ fears, there are no pogroms. Skinheads and the Klan must be watched, true, but they are small groups with little influence and less religion. The reason we fear to go out after dark is not that we may be set upon by bands of evangelicals and forced to read the New Testament, but that we may be set upon by gangs of feral young people who have been taught that nothing is superior to their own needs or feelings. And if religious (and secular) fanatics are to be feared, what could possibly strengthen their hand more than the continued disintegration of society? When the majority religion is under attack, should a minority feel safer? Christians are resented as reminders of universal ethical rules; will Jews be better received?

That a society can preserve ethical values and transmit them to subsequent generations in the absence of a permanent source for them is a belief un­supported by historical evidence. It requires a leap of faith just as does a belief in God. Nevertheless, we are betting everything we have that it is correct. As a Jew, I occasionally felt mild discomfort living in a Chris­tian country. As a human being and a Jew, I fre­quently feel real fear living in a post-Christian coun­try. A Christian country? Barely, and not for long, unless we do something about it.